Senator Gerard Craughwell- speech from 18 Nov 2021

Go raibh maith agat, Coirleach, Minister, you're welcome to the House. Minister, last evening in his speech to the Dáil, Minister Ryan clearly and unambiguously informed the House that there is no Act of the Oireachtas on the statute books given legal responsibility for Irish SAR to the Irish Aviation Authority. Let me say that again. Today as I speak, the IAA is not legally responsible for Irish SAR. This is the jaw-dropping and scandal of monumental proportions. It's distressing to have to address this House on the tragic loss of Rescue 116 and her four valiant crew members, Dara Fitzpatrick, Paul Duffy, Ciaran Smith and Paul Ormsby at Black Rock Island in 2017. And today I offer my condolences to the families and call on those close to them to ensure that they get legal advice for whichever jurisdiction they may deem best for them. Indeed, it's a tragedy, but one that should have been avoided long before the helicopter took to the sky. The litany of abysmal failures of ministers and senior civil servants at the Department of Transport, the Irish Coast Guard, the Irish Aviation Authority and most especially the operator CHC DAC have had grave and unacceptable ramifications. Those who held a ministerial brief or had a management role in these organisations, especially since 2010, need to reflect honestly on their respective records. CHC must not be allowed to tender for any part of the next SAR contract. The current procurement process must be halted in light of this report and we must have some part of the next contract provided by our sovereign service, the Irish Air Corps. The Department of Transport has failed and incredibly continues this very day to fail to legislate and legally assign responsibility for SAR regulation and operational safety to appropriate Irish entity, the Irish Aviation Authority. In 2010 report on constructing a future airborne SAR service chaired by the then head of the Irish Coast Guard, Chris Reynolds, sensibly recommended that the IAA legally oversee SAR safety and operations. In 2014, the IAA, acting on its own initiative, published a notice regarding SAR safety and operations. However, the notice had no legal import as the Department of Transport had failed to legislate, given legal responsibility for SAR oversight to the IAA. Eleven years later, four lives lost, the Department has still not given that legal responsibility to the IAA. It is astonishing, reckless and barely believable. The draft air navigation transport bill currently before the Oireachtas, if passed, will finally give legal certainty to the IAA overseeing SAR. Incredibly, no opposition amendments to this draft bill will be accepted by government, amendments recommended by the pilots. Ireland is a founder member of the United Nations international civil aviation body for many years, Ireland has led innovations in civil aviation with the development of aircraft leasing sector and low cost airline industry, thereby democratising air travel for all. The R116 report casts a dark shadow over these achievements, highlighting a catalogue of errors, omissions, faulty communications procedures, substandard navigation route designs, use of maps not fit for the purpose for which they are being used, and a continuing lacuna in the law, meaning there is no entity with legal oversight for Irish SAR. I believe that R116 disaster was preventable, that SAR crews, their families, and the citizens of Ireland have been failed. R116 should not have been out on that ill-fated night, tasked with providing top cover air communications. This is most effectively provided by fixed wing aircraft because of their greater communication range. At the time, reckless government policy had resulted in the inability of the Air Corps to provide fixed wing top cover on a 24-7 basis, due to pilot shortage. The Air Corps was then officially only able to provide fixed wing top cover on an as available basis. In 2015 and 2016 respectively, boards convened by the Department of Defence recommended a retention policy with financial incentives for Air Corps pilots to remain in state service. Both reports were left gathering dust, and the Air Corps pilot shortage continued. Since the R116 tragedy, a proper pilot retention policy was put in place in the Air Corps, it has been a success, but still has some way to go. Let us join the dots, Minister. If in 2015 and 2016, boards recommending Air Corps pilot retention had been acted upon, we would have had 24-7 Air Corps fixed wing capability, and most probably would have been in place in 2017, and R116 would not have had to take on that faithful mission. Ireland is one of only two European countries that have privatised its SAR service. The other is the UK. But unlike Ireland, however, the UK has a substantial sovereign SAR capability in both helicopters and fixed wing aircraft via the RAF. Ireland has failed to properly resource our Air Corps in aircraft and personnel in order to retain an appropriate sovereign capability. All responsible states retain a sovereign SAR capability for two reasons. Firstly, in case of loss of privatised SAR service due to industrial action, and secondly, in the unlikely event that an entire fleet of aircraft would be grounded for technical reasons. Ireland has recklessly allowed our Air Corps to be under-resourced in aircraft and crews, despite countless warnings of this folly. In 2011, the £6 billion sterling UK SAR bidding process was halted when a scandal broke. An inquiry during the bidding process revealed that there was wide insider trading of a kind. An official in the Ministry was leaking information on the bidding to one company. That company was CHC, who were then the preferred bidder for the UK, but ultimately they were removed from the process. Incredibly, almost at the same time, CHC was fortunate to find a home for their aircraft being awarded a 10-year contract in Irish SAR by the Irish Department of Transport for the Irish Coast Guard. And with the rich financial pickings, not alone was CHC awarded a 10-year contract for our SAR, that contract could be extended for up to a further three years, leading to an estimated cost of some €1 billion. Now we come to the real nub of the problem. Neither the Department of Transport nor the Irish Coast Guard has any aviation expertise. To overcome the deficits, what do they do? They contract in UK-based aviation SAR consultants. A number of examples will shock even those already not shocked. Post-Rescue 116 tragedy, after the draft final report was published, a review body was set up by the Department and a UK expert appointed to the body. Guess what? Within a short period of time, that expert had to resign because of an identified conflict of interest. Who vetted his appointment? Yet another example. Post-R116 tragedy, the Department of Transport awarded a tender to another UK-based company called Air Assurance to advise on aviation compliance. A one-man operation company, and when contracted by the Department, had a turnover in the previous year of 40,000 sterling and only one continuing contract. Most incredibly, post-Rescue 116 tragedy, the Department decided to recruit an aviation manager in the Irish Coast Guard. This competition had a closing date for receipt of applicants on Thursday 3rd December 2020, one year ago. Guess what? The position remains unfilled to this day. The pre-procurement process for the next 10-year SAR contract has been ongoing for some time. The Department contracted KPMG to produce a business case for the proposed contract. Astonishingly, KPMG has no suitable internal aviation expertise in this space. So what does it do? KPMG contracts a UK-based company called Fraser Nash to be its aviation advisor. Guess what? Fraser Nash, at the time of the contract, is owned by an aviation company called Babcock, a likely bidder for the Irish upcoming 10-year contract. Did Fraser Nash and KPMG recommend in the business case the Department of Transport at the Irish Coast Guard for the next SAR contract? Did they recommend that the Air Corps should be excluded from any part of the helicopter element of the next SAR contract? Even the East Coast Helicopter SAR service, which the Air Corps can easily deliver with state-owned assets and state-paid crews from Baldonnel. After all, why wouldn't Fraser Nash and KPMG make such a recommendation? More gravy for the boys and girls in the UK-based aviation companies. Milking the Irish Exchequer with substandard equipment and outputs this past 10 years and continuing. Awarding Irish SAR delivery solely to the UK-based clubby boys just referenced. The private operators continues the gravy train for them and degrades sovereign air corps capability. The business case produced by KPMG and Fraser Nash from your Department has not been published for reasons which are entirely spurious and suspicious. In the public interest, it must be published before any former tendering process for the next 10-year contract begins. The Irish Coast Guard has recently come to further unwelcome attention in reports by the CNAG and the Public Accounts Committee. The real culprit is not the Coast Guard. It is the Department of Transport itself. Firstly, it was revealed that the state paid $7.5 million in 2013 to retrofit the cockpits of CHC's helicopters to make them night vision goggle compatible. In addition, the state bought night vision goggles and ancillary night vision equipment, along with providing a budget for the conversion training of CHC pilots for night vision operation. The training has not yet been completed. However, this all started back in 2013. To date, it was not completed. The Air Accident Investigation Unit report in Rescue 116 frequent reference is made to Captain Darragh Fitzpatrick, our co-pilot Mark Duffy and other pilots commenting on the poor state of cockpit lighting in the S92 CHC helicopters. Who carried out the refitting or retrofitting of the S92 cockpits paid for by the state? Could the retrofitting of the cockpits explain the poor lighting? Has this been examined? Is there a requirement for an on-off switch in the cockpit? I'm just coming to an end now. For night vision versus non-night vision. Who certifies them as operational? In conclusion, by stating the sole delivery of SAR by private operators in Ireland needs to end for sound operational reasons. An East Coast SAR service and fixed-wing top cover must be provided by the sovereign Irish State Air Corps. I'll leave it at that, Minister. I think we need to go back and rethink everything about the current process. It is deeply flawed. Thank you. I'm with you, Joll.