Charles Ward: Who Pays for Defective Concrete?

I move this motion. I want to start by thanking all those who've worked on this motion, particularly my staff and 100% Redress Party councillors who work every day on the ground dealing with homeowners with defective concrete. I would like to thank Dr Chris Brough and Paul Dunlop, Professor Paul Dunlop, for the extremely important research done in this topic. I would also like to thank all my opposition TDs and their parties for supporting this motion. This motion is about the state that makes decisions about people's homes and circumstances where their own technical standard accepts the science is not fully developed in certain foundation cases. These decisions determine remediation, housing security and the level of uncertainty families are left carrying for decades. And at the centre of this is a simple question. When the science is not complete and the state must still act, who carries what remains unresolved? The state or the homeowner? I should inform this house that I am directly affected with this matter and I deal with this every day. I am living with the defective concrete crisis myself. I am not relying on this as a stage of this argument, but I mention it because it requires me to examine engineering reports and technical matters in great detail. And what these reports make clear is not a disagreement about whether the risk exists, it's how the uncertainty is defined within the system and how it is carried into decisions that affect homes, finance and long-term security. And this is the real issue here. How known limits and technical knowledge become policy decisions. The governing standard states the state of knowledge relating to foundations is insufficient to provide guidance for certain combinations of aggregate and active ISA risk factors. This is precisely the limitation written into the standard itself and it acknowledges that there is defined foundation conditions where scientific knowledge is based and significant to decision making. The standard continues, undertaking sampling, testing and analysis of foundation concrete is expected to strengthen the knowledge base and inform future editions of this very document. So the framework is not final and we're expected to evolve this as more evidence becomes available. Since tabling this motion I've hosted a scientific briefing in Leinster House attended by researchers directly involved investigating the effect of concrete deterioration mechanisms across Ireland. The purpose of that briefing was not to challenge science, it was to listen to the science. It was presented and reinforced a point already acknowledged within IS465 itself. Our understanding continues to evolve as more testing is undertaken and as long-term evidence becomes available. The research highlighted that the scale of defective properties will continue to expand significantly as testing progresses and deterioration becomes visible on properties that may not yet exhibit symptoms. This is precisely why this motion actually matters. When evidence base is still developing public policy must be designed to accommodate the reality rather than assume that all future outcomes are already known. It also states the purpose of foundation concrete testing is one to identify the aggregate types, two deleterious materials and three potential future deterioration. Testing identifies risk factors and it does not resolve how these factors behave over time in every case. So importantly foundation testing does not provide full evaluation of foundations current conditions which would necessitate more extensive sampling for inspection. Even after testing there's recognized limits in what is actually known about the structure. So this is a technical engineering standard and it's not designed for conveyancy or property transaction but in practice it is now influencing mortgage assessments, insurance decisions and property values in affected areas. And this is not theatrical, this is already reflected in homes are valued and financed and traded. So in places like Donegal defects and uncertainty are already visible in the house and market. So the house should also reflect carefully on what is presented at the scientific briefing because the research did not present an estimate for all homes in Donegal. Based on analysis that indicated that a minimum of 12,000 homes in Donegal alone may ultimately fall in within the high risk category. That does not include social homes which is 2,400 and does not include community buildings which are hundreds and does not include commercial premises, mixed-use buildings and the distinctions are extremely important. So when you hear a figure of 12,000 homes we are not looking at the full housing picture. It is a baseline and we're looking at only one segment of it. For years the state has pointed at figures of approximately 10,000 affected homes nationally. Yet we have known scientific analysis suggests that Donegal alone will definitely exceed that figure and that analysis prove if it's proven correct the scale of this crisis has been profoundly underestimated. The scale of the crisis has been underestimated and we must ask ourselves whether future risk has also been underestimated. So the position is clear the science is incomplete in defined areas the standard acknowledges this directly and the decisions are still required within a framework. When that happens uncertainty does not disappear. It is carried forward by the system and in practice the homeowners who carry it. The classification approach and the standard reinforces this structure. It states foundations concrete should be classified in accordance with samples from foundation concrete from the highest aggregate risk classification. That would be the the core sample taken with the most damage. Where multiple indicators exist the highest classification must apply. Risk is not averaged and determination the strongest identifying factor where uncertainty is not fully resolved it is not eliminated at the point of decision it is deferred. This is the issue and deferred uncertainty returns later as further remediation works higher public costs and increased complexity as scientific understanding develops over time and what is not resolved does not disappear. It re-emerges later on it's going to be more costly and in this motion is interpreted as it's not a criticism of the scientists or the engineers or the researchers who have worked and informed on IS 465 quite the opposite. Good science identifies not only known but also what is not yet known. The research involved has been transparent about the limits of current evidence. We need ongoing testing and expectations that understanding will continue to develop. The question before this house is therefore whether we trust the science. The question is whether policy is responding approximately to what the science itself is telling us. We have remaining uncertainty and this policy question is not a scientific one. This motion does not challenge the standard. It accepts what it states. It asks straightforward questions of policy coherence and where the state accepts scientific knowledge it is not yet complete in certain foundation conditions should the consequences and uncertainty be carried by the homeowner by default. If the answer is yes then this is clear policy choice but if the answer is no the system must adjust to reflect the reality of what is going on. The matters because this matters because the decision before us is not simply about foundations it's about the consequences of being wrong. The state has got this badly wrong once already. We're 14 years into this. Poor quality materials entered homes across affected counties and families are still paying the price today. We are being asked to make long-term foundation decisions in circumstances where the government standard itself acknowledges limitations in current knowledge where the evidence base continues to evolve and where uncertainty regarding long-term performance of retained foundations and if the scale of the affected properties is significantly greater than previously understood then potential consequences will will become enormous. Saving money today by retaining foundations where reasonable doubt remains may reduce immediate expenditure but those assumptions proved incorrect in the years ahead. The cost future failure will dwarf any short-term term saving. The cost will not be simply financial. It will be measured in homes requiring further remediation and families forced to go through a process for a second time and properties that become difficult to finance insure or sell and a housing system already struggling to meet demand. The state's first failure contributed to this crisis and it would be unforgivable if attempt to resolve it we were to spend public money in a manner that risks creating an even greater housing crisis into the future. When uncertainty remains caution is not an expensive option. Caution is a reasonable option and important to be clear what this means in practice. These are not abstract issues. They affect a home so a home can be sold, remortgaged or insured. They affect whether families can rely on their homes as stable long-term assets and they affect financial security and the housing market not just in Donegal but in all affected counties.