Gerard P. Craughwell: Questions Defence Readiness and Spending

Thank you, Chair. What I propose to do is list off a number of questions because we're tight on time, but I would want those answers. If you can't deliver them today, that you would provide answers afterwards. So I'll start off with the first one. The EU's strategic compass on security and defence was agreed in 2022. It was, as you referred to in your opening statement, a high-level policy initiative. For very recent briefings and discussions I've been a party to, both nationally and internationally, it's apparent to the wise and informed observers that the said compass is already significantly dated as it remains solely aspirational. Senior serving and veteran military leaders now refer to the compass as mere symbolic policies and believe that the focus needs to be urgently and solely on EU defence readiness. Do you agree, and if so, what ramifications does this reality have for our defence force capability attainment, seeing as most of the operational units of the defence forces across the three services are judged by internationally accepted norms of 50% leadership strength, and are in fact non-operational, as the leadership strength is in the late 30s, early 40s, as outlined at the recent RACO conference. So essentially what we're saying is our defence forces are non-operational. Secondly, you speak about infrastructure. Are you referring to bricks and mortar infrastructure, energy infrastructure, power generation structures or airports? And on airports, my colleague has already referred to the issue of drones. A situation where a ship 12 miles off the coast of Ireland could sit at what we might call a drone swarm on all of our airports on the western coast and on Baldonald and Dublin during the EU presidency. We don't have an anti-aircraft regiment anymore to have stood down and abandoned in 2012. So what policy is being put in place to re-establish an anti-aircraft regiment? The other one I'm interested in, we constantly refer to the defence forces in the peacekeeping role. Can you tell us what the primary role of the Irish defence forces is? I'm rather shocked to hear you refer to primary radar as not yet purchased. We were told on live radio three years ago that it would take 36 months to purchase primary radar. I don't want to put you on the spot on the next question, but I tend to do that anyway, so I'm sorry. The word on the street is that both the Department of Defence and the Defence forces wanted to use the safe money that was available. To quote Deputy Callan, the money was a 45-year loan, so it was a soft loan. It would have been easy to use. My understanding is that public expenditure and reform killed that. Is that true or false? And finally, we're looking at the end of UN service. And assuming the UN service goes, we've been involved with both NATO in the past and EU missions. So I'm wondering where the costs lie. Additionally, how troops would be, if you want to remunerate it for their time serving with some other organisation? It might be a bit ahead of time, because we haven't yet abandoned the triple lot. But if we do, how will it be done? Now, I'm sorry. Those are just questions that I feel need to be on the agenda. And I'm particularly concerned if the Department of Public Expenditure and Reform were in a position to actually shoot down a plan by the Department of Defence for Defence spending. The Minister, Antoinette, is on record as saying, first and foremost, that he sought 3.7 billion for defence this year. And secondly, he's on record as saying that we would buy a couple of squadrons of fighters. If you look at our sister European company, our country, Finland. Finland spends 6.77 billion on defence at the moment. I think it's 7.2 billion for 2026. We're spending 1.49. I still haven't figured out exactly how we're spending that money. Have we actually increased spending? Because that money may very well be absorbed by pensions and pay and standing charges like electricity, power, petrol, etc. So we need we need a breakdown of that 1.49 billion to see percentage-wise how much of an increase has there been in defence spending. Look, truth of the matter, Mr O'Marr, I know you have to work with what's laid in front of you and you have to build policy around that. And Mr Fitzgerald, likewise, to try and get as much as we can out of the European Union. But the bottom line on it is, if the department is being impeded by others, we need to know that. We need to be aware of what's going on. And I will be making a recommendation that we bring in deeper here to discuss defence spending with them, because I think it's an important issue. So I'm sorry about that. A load of questions there. You can take your time and write to us if you want, or you can try and answer some of them now. Thank you, Senator. I'll do my best 60 minutes, what is it, the old Larry Gogan thing. In terms of the questions, in terms of the compass, absolutely strategic compass, absolutely agree. Very unfortunate in terms of its development, that the final stages of its drafting was in spring of 2022. Indeed, I was in Brussels at the time negotiating it. And it was, I think, 99% done, and then all of a sudden, the Russian invasion of Ukraine impacted on it. And yeah, there is absolutely a school of thought there that it needs to be considerably revised. And I think in terms of looking at the initiative since, in terms of the white paper, in terms of readiness, that's what you're seeing. And you would have, one of the key aspects of the compass would have been, there was an intelligence assessment at the start, to identify the risks, risk assessment, sorry, to identify the risks facing Europe. And there was a part of the compass was a midterm risk assessment to be, that essentially was, the midterm risk assessment was almost repurposed for the white paper, to underpin the white paper. So theoretically, it could be, it could be said that maybe the white paper was a development, a redrawing of the compass, but you're absolutely correct in terms of the timing of it was very unfortunate and didn't necessarily get the chance to take account of the, the, the, the turmoil that then erupted in, in, in spring of 22. In, in terms of just the primary role of the Defence Force, obviously is, is the defence of the state. And in terms of the, your question around the UNIFIL question, and in, in terms of overseas, overseas, overseas deployments and, and, and allowances, was, was, was that the focus? Yeah, yeah, really, yeah. Yeah. No, I mean, the UNIFIL, the UNIFIL, mandate renewal this summer was, was quite, was, was, was very tricky. And I think, we were from, from coming to, coming from a space where we thought maybe it would end immediately, and, and then people would have to be brought home to the end of 2026, at least allows time for planning in terms of, um, uh, uh, an exit strategy, which can, could potentially take place in, in the early part of 27 as well. And then also in, in terms of future overseas deployment for other Defence Forces. But obviously that is something that the Department and the Defence Forces are considering in, in terms of where, um, where the Defence Forces may be deployed. Just, you referenced, uh, historically, uh, the Defence Forces would have, uh, uh, taken part, um, in, in, in a particular NATO mission. And they're still actually in, in, in, in, in, in Kosovo, which is, which is NATO-led, but obviously with the UN Security Council mandate. Um, in terms of, um, in terms of the measures with regards to the Defence Forces, um, the, the, the Department has put in place, and the Minister has put in place a range of measures, uh, to improve recruitment and retention in the Defence Force. I think at the same time, that has also accepted, uh, a number of Ministers have accepted that there are challenges in terms of, of recruitment and retention. But there is a hope there that we're, we're, we're, um, we're starting to, to, to turn the ship. And I, I think some of the key initiatives brought in, uh, initially, uh, regard, were, were to do with the, the paying conditions of Defence Forces personnel. And I think it's probably worthwhile, again, making clear what, what those are, particularly for, in terms of starting salaries. So, uh, a recruit on completion of training, on 24 weeks training, will commence on 41,800 Euro. In year one, in year two, it'll be 43,300. And in year three, it'll be 44,600. So the starting pay of a private three-star has risen by approximately 49% since 2019. Um, And you didn't keep the differentials. So when you're a corporal, there's not a great increase in salary. I, I, there, there is a project, uh, one of the recommendations of the CODF was also in terms of, uh, long service increments, which would hopefully, if that's progressed, can, can, can address that. But, uh, I think in terms of, say, school-leaver cadets also, if, if I may, uh, on commissioning, a school-leaver cadet is, is now paid 45,700. And where a cadet graduate joins, it starts at 51,180. So, uh, the range of other measures have been brought in as well, in terms of, say, the doubling of patrol duty allowance for the naval service, in terms of, um, the extension of private medical care, uh, across the Defence Forces to all members of the Defence Forces. Um, and then the, the, say, other, um, incentives such as, um, technical payment allowances, duty allowances, et cetera, which, um, if they're, if they're pensionable, they increase in line with, um, with public, um, public pay agreements. And public pay agreements obviously apply as well. So there are a range of measures in the pay aspect. Uh, the Defence budget, um, has increased, uh, uh, as you, as you correctly, uh, point out from approximately 1 billion to approximately 1.49. We're happy to, to seek a breakdown and, and provide that subsequently. And then, um, um, I think your final point was on SAFE. And in terms of the, the decision of whether or not Ireland, um, uh, takes part in SAFE. And essentially, um, SAFE, as, as you know, and, uh, you may have seen the, the, the, the appearance, uh, by our colleagues in Department of Finance, uh, public expansion reform, and defence at, uh, Finpert, uh, last week where this was examined in some depth. Um, and the, um, given this is a finance regulation led, um, it was decided by the three departments involved that Ireland would not be, uh, availing of SAFE. Um, and, um, I think that was made clear last week. Uh, and we're happy to, uh, to, to, to, to again say why. Of the, not taking part in SAFE, I should add in terms of the loan aspect, but certainly open to taking part at this stage of the loan aspect, but certainly open to taking part in common procurement opportunities that will arise under it. And Brendan may correct me here on it, but those common procurement opportunities will arise where we are part, say, of a consortium where one member of that consortium is drawing down funds from the instrument that will then allow us to take part. And we're being, we're being seen as freeloading on the member that's using SAFE money to buy, uh, military equipment and the Irish come in behind and avail at the cheap price without having taken out the loan and they buy what they can afford. It's like, it's like you're going into Tesco's and standing beside somebody at the checkout and saying, do you mind if I, uh, throw a pint of milk beside you there? You know, I mean, it was, it was, it was outrageous that we didn't avail of SAFE. I know you're not going to answer that, and that's fine. I accept that. Do you want to go? Okay.