Sharon Keogan: Kinship Care, Constitutional Risks and TUSLA Warning

Thank you Cathaoirleach. Minister, you're very welcome in again to the Chamber and I welcome the opportunity to speak on this Bill. At the outset, I want to say that I approach the Bill with a great degree of caution and circumspection as it warrants. I myself have substantial personal experience in helping children from troubled homes and situations and recognise the great difficulty and complexity that comes with such issues, especially in how we are to legislate on these issues. In this case, there are a number of tensions that merit consideration as it progresses to committee stage. First the role of the wider family, particularly kinship care. I believe that as a state we should look to models that recognise that children are best supported where possible within their extended family networks. Grandparents and relatives often provide stability in the most difficult cases. Outside of this Bill, even where a child is being cared for by grandparents or close relatives, those carers have no ability to initiate or trigger an application in relation to guardianship. It appears they are entirely dependent on TUSNA choosing to act. This means that the people who are often most directly responsible for the child's day-to-day welfare have no formal role in the legal process governing that child's future. That creates a clear disconnect. I would like to see greater support for kinship care and think that law should reflect it, not by displacing the state, but by recognising that those closest to the child may have a legitimate role in protecting them. There is scope here to consider a more balanced model that allows some structured role for family members. Second the constitutional dimension. This Bill allows for restriction and, in some cases, removal of guardianship. That is understandable. But even in the most extreme cases, the individual remains the parent of the child. A criminal conviction does not dissolve that relationship. It does not dissolve that unconditional love that that child has for that parent, despite the most heinous crime that that parent may have done. Our constitutional framework treats the parent-child relationship with particular weight. We are not simply removing administrative rights. We are intervening in one of the most fundamental legal relationships we recognise. In some cases, circumstances may change. Things may be overturned, or children as they grow may form their own views about contact. The safeguards in the Bill are important, but there is room to go further, to further ground the legislation in proportionality and to check its constitutionality, ensuring that we protect children while still recognising the enduring nature of that relationship. Third, the role of TUSLA. As drafted, TUSLA is effectively the gatekeeper. The process begins only if the agency acts. In some cases, it depends on a reasonable cause threshold. In others, it is simply that the agency considers appropriate. If TUSLA does act, the legislation is never triggered. It does not act. The legislation is never triggered. That is a significant concentration of power, and one that must be viewed in light of current realities. Public confidence in TUSLA is not where it needs to be, and that is reflected in a number of serious, well-documented cases. We have seen, for example, the murder of the poor Ukrainian boy under TUSLA care, or the case of the City West where the 10-year-old victim of the alleged sexual assault had been missing from TUSLA supervision for over 24 hours. We have also seen repeated judicial criticisms, finding that TUSLA failed to comply with hundreds of courts' directions, affecting hundreds of children. A High Court description of its approach to court orders is wholly unsatisfactory. A district court finding that its conduct was shocking and appalling, including cases where children were left without allocated social workers despite court orders. These are not abstract concerns. These are findings from our courts about the performance of the very body to which the Bill assigns decisive gatekeeping power. This is not about individual social workers either, who often work under immense pressure. But it does raise a legitimate question. Is it appropriate to place such a high level of discretion in a single agency, without additional safeguards, balance and alternative pathways? If the attention is that these serious concerns should come before the courts, then we should be cautious about a system where that outcome depends entirely on an internal decision within TUSLA. For that reason, I intend at committee stage to bring forward amendments to look at these issues. Ultimately, if we are serious about protecting children, the system must be robust, not only in principle but in practice, and we must ensure that no single point of failure can prevent the law from operating as intended.