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Gerard P. Craughwell: Calls for Statutory Emergency Management

Gerard P. Craughwell: Calls for Statutory Emergency Management

Gerard P. Craughwell argued for a statutorily based, overarching emergency management structure in Ireland, saying Storm Owen exposed serious weaknesses in national resilience. He warned that the storm devastated the electricity grid and water resources, traumatised citizens and showed the limits of current arrangements.

Storm Owen and infrastructure damage


Craughwell described the widespread impact of Storm Owen on critical national infrastructure, singling out damage to the electricity grid and water resources. He said national and international repair crews were still deployed three weeks after the storm and full recovery had not been achieved, leaving people with specific health needs, such as dialysis, fearful and many properties and community facilities in ruins.

Legislative gap in Ireland's emergency framework


He highlighted that Ireland lacks a statutory or legislative base for its emergency management structure, noting the EU treats civil protection as a subsidiarity matter and provides coordination but not legislation. Craughwell said the current language around Ireland's arrangements is framed as guidance and recommendations rather than duties, and pointed to the 2006 major emergency framework (which replaced 1984 arrangements) as regional in scope and currently under review, while Strategic Emergency Planning (2004) was to be replaced by a national framework in 2015.

Structures, responsibilities and subsidiarity


Craughwell outlined the operational components of emergency management as the Garda, the Health Service Executive and local authorities, and he discussed the lead government department concept for identified risks. He emphasised subsidiarity - that emergencies should be handled at the lowest appropriate level while keeping higher authorities informed - and noted that a national emergency coordination group is convened in crises to coordinate a whole-of-government response and may sometimes need to act as a decision-making forum.

Comparative models and proposed measures


Referencing international practice, Craughwell cited the UK Civil Contingencies Act 2004 as an example of primary legislation that sets principles, structures and regulatory duties and allows secondary regulations. He argued for clearer statutory powers, a national surge capacity for personnel and equipment reserves and an additional national contingency resilience notice so the State can cope adequately with foreseeable disasters, noting that other jurisdictions often use a single strong central voice in major emergencies.

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Transcript
Minister, you're welcome to the House and congratulations on your elevation. Minister, I believe that there is now a requirement for a statutorily based overarching emergency management structure in Ireland. Storm Owen had a devastating impact throughout Ireland. It had a destructive impact on our critical national infrastructure, especially our electricity grid and water resources. Three weeks from deploying national and international repair crews, full recovery of these infrastructure resources had not been achieved. Citizens had been left traumatised by these delays returning to full capacity. Property and community facilities lay in ruins. Many with specific health issues such as dialysis were left in fear of their very lives as a result of this terrible storm. Contrary to some comments, these devastating storms are fast becoming regular events in Ireland. Widespread floods and storm damage now visit this country increasingly regularly. Many are questioning the state's strategic readiness and capacity in emergency management response. Those voices are getting louder and louder. I believe that the complete review of the emergency planning is long overdue. It's time that we took a look under the bonnet of emergency management and examined exactly how Ireland's resilience to such stress tests will cope. Most chair will know that the three legs of the emergency management stool are the Garda Siakon of the health service executive and local authorities. However, while each of these entities are statutorily based, there is no super statutory body overseeing their response or outputs in the event of a civil emergency. Minister, you will know that the EU perspective on civil protection is a subsidiarity issue. The EU provides the coordination but does not legislate. Legislation in this space is a matter for each member state. Ireland is unique as it's the only member state in the EU which does not have a legislative or statutory base for its emergency management structure and response. The lack of legislation puts the emergency structure and the processes at severe disadvantage in Ireland. The language used in relation to Ireland's emergency management speaks about guidance and recommendations but nowhere does it require or compel actions. Primary responsibility rests with the government of the day to protect our territory and citizens against disasters and to provide disaster management systems. Such systems should have sufficient full-spectrum immediate on-call capabilities, identifiable and readily available. A national notice to move surge capacity personnel equipment reserve along with an additional third national contingency resilience or notice to enable our country to cope adequately with disasters that can reasonably be expected and be prepared for. The framework for emergency management has been in place since 2006 which replaced the earlier arrangements put in place in 1984. The 2006 document sets out mechanisms for coordination at all levels of major emergency on-site at local levels and regional levels. However, it does not cover arrangements at national level, so at best it could be referred to as regional framework. The 2006 framework is currently under review. Strategic Emergency Planning, which has specific core points, was published by the Office of Emergency Planning Planning in 2004 and was to be replaced by a national framework in 2015. The national framework is focused on providing strategic guidance and direction to government departments and agencies under its aegis. The national framework is not to be confused with major emergency management framework. The lead government department concept, where responsibility for emergency management management of identified risks is allocated to the most appropriate government department is at the core of strategic emergency planning guidance. Government departments are not subordinate to each other. Implementing the decisions made by the lead government department, which may impact on another department, can be very complex and sometimes unworkable. The designation of the most appropriate government department is not always the most advantageous. In organising response, currently care must be taken not to intrude on matters appropriate to decision-making by ministers. In all circumstances, each department must ensure that their minister is kept briefed on any emergency or crisis situation. Among core points in strategic emergency planning guidance is subsidiarity. Emergencies should be handled at the lowest possible level, while at all times keeping the higher levels of the authority aware of the situation where appropriate. Minister, you will know that in an emergency, a national emergency coordination group is created. The primary role of this group is to coordinate a whole of government response, as you pointed out yourself in your speech. In certain circumstances, this group may have to act as a decision-making form as opposed to merely coordinating departments and agencies. In Ireland, decision-making is not usual at this level. In other jurisdictions, it is the norm. Clear policy decisions are issued. The intent of those decisions moves to specific actions at lower levels in the structure where necessary detail is added. An act like the UK Civil Contingencies Act of 2004 sets out philosophy, principles, structures and regulatory duties for emergency response. It is a form of primary legislation allowing for the provision of secondary legislation to permit or require that a person or a body is or is not to perform a duty under the relevant regulation. Misconceptions exist about major emergency response and civil protection. A difficult political dimension to a major emergency. A government has to manage, but emergencies must be managed, and it takes resources and political energy. Experience from other EU countries and the US shows that the concept of a single strong voice or individual leader or central organisation to take charge is a fallacy. However, what is required is a clear decision-making mandate and a process to activate a decision quickly. There must be a process in place to ensure that decisions are implemented once they are made. Various emergency services are the primary responders when disaster strikes. Secondary responders such as power and telecommunications companies and other utilities such as water, gas, defence forces and civil defence perform a vital role in response where the primary responders cannot provide a response on time. Current gaps in emergency response. Both research and experience in other countries show the following areas give best improvement in overall response but only achieved when demanded by regulation. Fostering community resilience. My colleague mentioned that in her speech. By having in-date relevant contingency plan, providing training and creating a response structure. This needs to be the responsibility of a designated official in resilience fora based in a local geographic area. Coordination of secondary response by utilities should be on a regulatory basis. Critical infrastructure needs to be identified and classified appropriately for action. An effective and truthful lesson learned and I hope you mentioned you will be looking back at the response to the storm. So lessons learned process must be put in place for the exercise and respond to emergencies. This must be based on a no blame functionality. So we can look at it in honesty and we're not looking for heads to roll or anything like that. What we're looking is to learn. Mandatory stress testing, simulation training and exercises in benign scenarios for managers and coordinators at senior level to include political leaders. Desktop exercises are merely conversations. Response actions should be in place on receipt of and in advance of a specific warning. Warnings and information, the public is insufficient. There has to be specific preparatory actions depending on the degree of anticipated impact. Getting control of the media message is vital. This is particularly true of social media and critical for confidence in community resilience. An ICT-based decision support and reporting system will give a faster and more effective response. Currently, relevant data is significantly out of date when it is assembled for analysis. Decision makers are often dependent on media reports. Key issues are not recognised. In summary, Minister, without a legislative base there will be no requirement or incentive to join elements that already exist in Ireland for emergency management into an effective efficient structure. A possible approach is to alter the role of the Office of Emergency Planning to an interdepartmental legal entity with a clear mandate and appropriate authority. This is what the government envisaged when the Office of Emergency Planning was created in the aftermath of 9-11 in 2001. Regardless of what government department any such statutory body would reside in, it would be mere window dressing without a government commitment to annualised guaranteed funding to support such an overdue emergency management response policy. It is what developed democracies do to safeguard their citizens. In conclusion, Minister, I have to congratulate the workers on the ground, local authority, ESB, gas, water etc. who put themselves in danger to go out there and get their communities back online. Despite the fact that I am calling for a statutory based emergency planning, I have to compliment that the government did a good job as well. At the end of the day, the damage that was done was unprecedented and would take many, many, many countries by surprise. We do not need to get over-critical of what happened. I think a good job was done by all, but I would like you to look at the statutory basis. Thank you, Minister. Thank you. Thank you, Mr.